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Introduction
On 27  December  1979,  Soviet  forces  invaded  Afghanistan,  assassinating  the  Afghan
leader, Hafizullah Amin, and replacing him with Babrak Karmal in the hope of ending a popular
revolt against the Communist regime. More than 100,000 Soviet troops were quickly deployed,
turning the internal revolt into a full-scale war against a foreign invader. Millions of refugees
flocked  to  Pakistan  and  Iran.  Pakistan  became  a  sanctuary  for  the  Afghan  resistance,  the
mujahidin.  The  country  had  a  long-standing  border  dispute  with  Afghanistan  over  Pashtun-
populated areas. This tension, that several time in the past came close to armed confrontation, had
been aggravated in the recent years by the ideological divide resulting from the military coups
occurring  in  both  countries.  While  communists  had  taken  power  in  Afghanistan  in  1978,
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s rule on Pakistan was based since 1977 on Islamism. The mujahidin
could also count on the support of some Western and Arab Gulf countries, which supplied them
with money, arms and training, transforming the Afghan crisis into one of the last chapters of the
Cold War.
Due to the opposition of the Soviet Union, the UN Security Council was unable to adopt a
resolution  condemning  the  invasion  of  Afghanistan  and  the  matter  was  addressed  in  an
emergency session of the General Assembly. Assembly Resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980
deplored  the  armed  intervention  and  called  for  the  “immediate,  unconditional  and  total
withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan”i. Subsequently, UN Secretary-General Kurt
Waldheim appointed Javier  Pérez de Cuéllar  as his  Personal  Representative  for  Afghanistan.
Pérez de Cuéllar shuttled between Moscow, Washington, Islamabad and Kabul, yet the positions
of  Afghanistan and Pakistan appeared irreconcilable.  For the regime in Kabul,  the mujahidin
were proxies for Pakistan and direct negotiations between the two governments were necessary,
while Pakistan insisted on self-determination for the Afghan people. Faced with the impossibility
of a direct dialogue, the UN adopted a policy of indirect rapprochement.
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Due to Perez de Cuellar’s election as UN Secretary-General in 1981, Diego Cordovez
(Ecuador) became the new Special Representative and succeeded in initiating indirect negotiation
in Geneva, beginning in June 1982. After a series of contacts, Pérez de Cuéllar suggested a four-
point agenda, which was ultimately the basis of the 1988 Geneva Accords. 
The  growing  condemnation  of  the  Soviet  occupation  among  UN  member  states,  the
political reforms of Gorbachev in the USSR from 1986 and the lack of decisive military results
on the ground explain the Soviet decision to withdraw. The Geneva Accords (Agreements on the
Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan) were signed on 14 April 1988ii. They were
designed to oversee the withdrawal of Soviet troops and a political transition in Afghanistan. The
Accords consisted of four instruments: 
- a bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan on the principles of non-interference and non-intervention; 
- a declaration on international guarantees, signed by the USSR and the United States; 
-  a  bilateral  agreement  between  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  on  the  voluntary  return  of
refugees; 
- and an agreement on the interrelationships for the settlement of the situation relating to
Afghanistan,  signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan and witnessed by the Soviet Union and the
United Statesiii. 
This  last  instrument  contained  provisions  to  monitor  the  Soviet  withdrawal.  The  UN
Secretary-General was asked to appoint a Representative with a support staff. Through his good
offices, the parties were to implement smoothly the arrangements contained in the Accords. A
month later, in May 1988, the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
(UNGOMAP) was established. It was officially confirmed by Security Council resolution 622 of
31 October 1988iv.
UNGOMAP was officially created by Security Council  resolution 622 of 31 October
1988 to assist Afghanistan and Pakistan in implementing the Geneva Accords and to investigate
and report any violations of the Accords. The mission was active from May 1988, following the
signing of the four part Agreements, and ceased operations on 15 March 1990.
The cost of the mission, $14 million, was covered by the appropriations from the regular
budget of the UN Expenditures. UNGOMAP comprised 40 officers temporarily detached from
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existing peacekeeping operations (UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL)  and ten officers from Austria,
Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Poland and Sweden.
Authorized strength and maximum deployment: 50 military observers,  supported by a
number of international and local civilian staff
At withdrawal:  35 military observers, supported by a number of international and local
civilian staff
Fatalities: None
The Course of the mission
To  monitor  the  Geneva  Accords,  a  Representative  of  the  Secretary-General  –  Mr.
Cordovez – was appointed and assisted by a support staff that constituted the United Nations
Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). A senior military officer –
Major-General  Rauli  Helminen (Finland)  –  was  designated  as  Deputy to  the Representative.
UNGOMAP  established  two  headquarters,  one  in  Kabul  and  the  other  in  Islamabad,  each
consisting of five military officers and a civilian component. Fifty military officers and up to 40
additional  officers  were  temporarily  redeployed  from existing UN operations  (the  UN Truce
Supervision Organization in  the Middle East,  the UN Disengagement  Observer  Force on the
Golan Heights and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon)v. 
The  UNGOMAP’s  mandate  included:  the  monitoring  of  non-interference  and  non-
intervention by Afghanistan and Pakistan in each other’s internal affairs; the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan; and the voluntary return of refugees. 
The successful monitoring of the Soviet withdrawal
The  Geneva  Accords  contained  provisions  for  the  timetable  and  modalities  of  the
withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops  from  Afghanistan.  To  monitor  the  withdrawal,  UNGOMAP
coordinated with the Soviet and Afghan representatives on the schedule and roads taken. Three
permanent outposts were established to monitor the Soviet withdrawal: at the border points of
Hayratan and Torghundi, and at the Shindand air base, used for withdrawal by air. The Soviet
army had approximately 100,000 soldiers located in half of the Afghan provinces. On 12 May,
1988  the  withdrawal  began  at  Jalalabad  and  Kandahar,  then  on  26  July  at  Shindand.  In
accordance  with  the  stipulations  of  the  fourth  instrument  of  the  Geneva  Accords,  the  first
withdrawal  from  Kabul  took  place  in  August,  by  which  time,  according  to  marshal  Boris
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Gromov,  the commander  in  chief  of  the Red Army,  no more  than half  of  the Soviet  forces
remained, concentrated into the six provinces of Kabul, Baghlan, Samangan, Kapisa, Farah and
Herat1.
Between 15 August 1988 and 1 January 1989, Soviet troops interrupted temporarily their
withdrawal, probably due to logistical problems. However, in a matter of days,  troops started
again to leave by air and by road in grouped convoys,  and on 15 February 1989, the Soviet
withdrawal was completed. Finding compliance from all actors over this issue, UNGOMAP did
not face major difficulties and succeeded in this part of its mandate. The 50 officers facilitated
communication between the belligerent over the different phases of withdrawal and ensured the
completion of the process.
The failure to monitor non-interference and non-intervention
From the outset of UNGOMAP’s mission, Kabul and Islamabad complained about each
other’s  interference.  In  particular,  Afghanistan  mentioned  the  continuing border  crossings  of
mujahidin coming from the training camps in Pakistan,  the violations of Afghan airspace by
Pakistani aircraft, as well as activities of the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) in Afghanistan.
Afghan  complaints  were  especially  numerous  in  the  months  following  the  Soviet
withdrawal. From the spring of 1989, the mujahidin launched a series of military operations, the
most  important  ones  against  the  city  of  Jalalabad,  which  were  supposed  to  bring  down  the
Afghan  government.  Pakistan  participated  in  this  massive  offensive  both  directly,  with  the
presence of ISI officers alongside the mujahidin, and indirectly by providing a sanctuary and
logistical help. 
On the Pakistani side, the complaints included violations of airspace, the use of SCUD
missiles  in  Pakistani  territory  and  “terrorist  attacks”  (bombings  attributed  to  the  Afghan
intelligence, the KHAD, especially in Peshawar).
UNGOMAP  was  not  equipped  to  deal  with  these  large-scale  incidents.  The  outposts
established in November 1988 in Peshawar and Quetta in Pakistan were far from the battlefield
and the  new posts established in  April  1989,  at  Torkham,  Teri  Mangal  and  Chaman on the
Afghan  side of the border  with Pakistan,  were no more able  to monitor  the situation on the
ground. Furthermore, neither Islamabad nor Kabul was willing to collaborate with UNGOMAP;
1 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present, Hurst & Company, London, 2005.
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they were following their own agendas  and the UN mission had neither the mandate nor the
means to accomplish its mission. Without the cooperation of the actors involved in the conflict,
UNGOMAP  could  only  register  the  complaints  from  each  side  without  investigating  them
thoroughly and could not take any measure to coerce them to comply with the Accords.
The impossibility of effectively monitoring the voluntary return of refugees
Despite  being  an  explicit  part  of  the  UNGOMAP  mandate,  the  voluntary  return  of
millions of refugees could not be supervised by the under-resourced UN mission. In practice, the
UN  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  was  in  charge  of  the  Agreement  on  the
Voluntary Return of Refugees  and UNGOMAP was tasked only to inform it on the security
conditions within Afghanistan. Yet with 50 personnel and its outposts located near to the Afghan-
Pakistan border, UNGOMAP could not collect sufficient information. In addition, the voluntary
return  of  refugees  was  an  unrealistic  expectation.  The  fighting  did not  stop after  the  Soviet
withdrawal.  UNGOMAP’s mandate was focused on the international  dimension of the armed
conflict, but even without Soviet troops, the war continued between Najibullah’s regime and the
mujahidin. Due to this heavy fighting inside Afghanistan, few refugees were able to come back to
Afghanistan during the period of the UNGOMAP mandate.
Termination of the mission
The  UNGOMAP  mandate  was  extended  for  two  months  by  UN  Security  Council
resolution 647 (11 January 1990). This was decided as the 20-month timeframe initially defined
in the Geneva accords was dependent on the beginning of the implementation of the instruments,
yet the third instrument on refugee return, had not begun. The Secretary-General therefore had
grounds for a  mandate extension, but  this was conditional  upon the goodwill  of the Security
Council’s members. In fact, when Javier Perez de Cuellar tried to obtain another extension of the
mission in  November  1990,  no consensus  could be reached  in  the Council,  and the mission
therefore ended. The United States was then disengaging itself from the war and a UN mission
was considered useless in the context of the new phase of the civil war. 
This was effected on 15 March 1990. To maintain a UN presence, the Secretary-General
created  the  Office  of  the  Secretary-General  in  Afghanistan  and  Pakistan  (OSGAP)  with  a
mandate  to  assist  the  return  of  refugees  and  facilitate  a  political  settlementvi.  Benon  Sivan
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(Cyprus), Assistant Secretary-General, was appointed head of the new structure and also became
the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan. However, this under-funded mission,
created from the remnants of UNGOMAP whose only achievement had been to monitor Soviet
troop withdrawal, could not succeed. It lacked the necessary resources to influence decisively a
situation  that  was  getting  more  and  more  complex,  as  Afghan  factions  and  their  respective
foreign  supporters  involved  in  fighting  were  multiplying. Without  influence  on  the  Afghan
parties and no strong support from the international  community,  the OSGAP was not able to
contain in any significant manner the civil war that developed after the fall of Kabul in 1992 to a
coalition of former Mujahidin parties, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, Ahmed
Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani's  Jamiat-e Islami,  Abdul Rashid Dostum's Junbish-i
Milli  and Abdul Ali  Mazari's  Hezb-e Wahdat.  Fighting rapidly broke out  among the various
factions and, when the OSGAP mandate ended on 31 January 1995, the civil war was still going
onvii.  The UN role became residual, a situation which lasted until  1999, when sanctions were
taken  against  the  Taliban.  Three  years  earlier,  this  clerical  movement,  born  in  1994  in  the
province of Kandahar, had taken over Kaboul and most of the Afghan territory from the coalition
of former Mujahidin leaders. At that time, the civil war was limited to the North, where, under
the name of the Northern Alliance, the remnants of the Mujahidin kept fighting the Taliban. Yet,
the return of the UN involvement in the Afghan conflict did not allude to the civil war, but to the
presence of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
UNGOMAP took place in the context of renewed UN activism and provided an early
post-cold war indication of the potential opportunities and the challenges of UN mediation and
peacekeeping.  When actors  were willing to  comply with  UNGOMAP (in  the monitoring the
Soviet withdrawal for example), the UN mission could accomplish its mandate. Conversely when
the  agenda  of  the  states  and  armed  groups  involved  cut  across  UNGOMAP’s  mandate  (in
monitoring the non-intervention and non-interference and the voluntary return of refugees for
example), the UN operation lacked both resources and support to achieve its objectives. It could
only register  complaints,  but  not  act  upon  them.  Despite  the  multiplication  of  peacekeeping
missions after  the  end of  the  1980s,  the  UN as  a  whole  remained  largely dependent  on the
goodwill of the member states within the UN for its good offices to succeed in Afghanistan, as
elsewhere. When the regional powers, notably Pakistan, took the front seat in the 1990s, the UN
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was de facto marginalize and will only be back in the Afghan crisis with the sanction against the
Taliban, when again a consensus could be attained between the major powers.
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